Co-management of Traditional Foods: Opportunities and Limitations for Food Security in Northern First Nation Communities by Cruickshank, Ainslie et al.
ARCTIC
VOL. 72, NO. 4 (DECEMBER 2019) P. 360 – 380
https://doi.org/10.14430/arctic69363
Co-management of Traditional Foods:
Opportunities and Limitations for Food Security in Northern First Nation Communities
Ainslie Cruickshank,1 Geranda Notten,1 Sonia Wesche,2 Kate Ballegooyen3 and Geraldine Pope3
(Received 1 May 2018; accepted in revised form 14 May 2019)
ABSTRACT. Traditional foods that First Nations peoples harvest or gather from the land remain critically important for 
achieving and sustaining food security for many communities. In Canada’s North, land claim agreements include provisions 
for First Nations to participate in the governance of their traditional territories, including the co-management of important 
traditional (wild-harvested) food species. Because such agreements only specify the broad contours of co-management 
governance, their actual functioning evolves out of a complex interplay among the co-managing organizations over the 
course of time. This paper aims to deepen our understanding of how First Nations communities can enhance food security 
as participants in co-management. Our study connects research on food security with research on co-management and is 
the first to analyze how First Nations can improve their food security by influencing decision-making that affects traditional 
foods through co-management arrangements. Following a succinct review of the Indigenous food security and co-management 
literatures, we analyze the experiences of Kluane First Nation in enhancing community food security through the 
co-management of its traditional territory with Yukon Government and Parks Canada, interpreting the data in light of the 
theories and evidences offered by research on co-management. The analysis of data collected from semi-structured interviews 
and from First Nations and government resources shows that, while the co-management system is imperfect, it does offer a 
mechanism through which First Nations can exert influence on decisions that affect their food security. The three key themes 
emerging from the excerpts confirm the importance of co-management as an evolutionary and long-term process, in which 
trust- and relationship-building are ongoing activities that are fundamental to beneficial collaboration involving the sharing 
of information and power. The analysis also highlights the role of context, or situational factors, in facilitating or hindering 
collaboration.
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RÉSUMÉ. Pour de nombreuses collectivités, les aliments traditionnels que les peuples des Premières Nations récoltent ou 
recueillent sur la terre continuent de revêtir une importance primordiale pour atteindre et maintenir la sécurité alimentaire. 
Dans le Nord canadien, les ententes de revendications territoriales comprennent des dispositions selon lesquelles les Premières 
Nations peuvent jouer un rôle dans la gouvernance de leurs territoires traditionnels, ce qui comprend la cogestion des espèces 
alimentaires (sauvages et cueillies) traditionnelles importantes. Puisque ces ententes ne font mention que des grandes lignes 
de la gouvernance en cogestion, leur fonctionnement est le résultat, en réalité, d’une interaction complexe entre les organismes 
de cogestion au fil du temps. Cet article cherche à mieux comprendre comment les collectivités des Premières Nations peuvent 
améliorer leur sécurité alimentaire à titre de participants à la cogestion. Notre étude fait le lien entre les recherches sur la 
sécurité alimentaire et les recherches sur la cogestion. Il s’agit de la première étude qui analyse la manière dont les Premières 
Nations peuvent améliorer leur sécurité alimentaire en influençant les décisions qui ont des incidences sur les aliments 
traditionnels, et ce, par le biais d’accords de cogestion. Après un examen succinct de la documentation qui existe au sujet de la 
sécurité alimentaire et de la cogestion, nous analysons l’expérience de la Première Nation de Kluane en matière d’amélioration 
de la sécurité alimentaire de la collectivité grâce à la cogestion de son territoire traditionnel avec le gouvernement du Yukon 
et Parcs Canada, puis nous interprétons les données à la lumière de théories et d’éléments de preuve découlant de travaux 
de recherche sur la cogestion. L’analyse des données recueillies à partir d’entrevues semi-structurées auprès de Premières 
Nations et de gouvernements montre que bien que le système de la cogestion soit imparfait, il offre un mécanisme permettant 
aux Premières Nations d’exercer une influence sur les décisions touchant leur sécurité alimentaire. Les principaux thèmes 
qui émergent de ces influences confirment l’importance de la cogestion à titre de processus évolutionnaire à long terme, dans 
le cadre duquel l’édification de la confiance et la conclusion de relations constituent des aspects fondamentaux en vue d’une 
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collaboration bénéfique fondée sur le partage de l’information et du pouvoir. Par ailleurs, notre analyse met en évidence le rôle 
du contexte, ou les facteurs situationnels, qui facilitent la collaboration ou lui nuisent.
Mots clés : sécurité alimentaire; aliments traditionnels; Premières Nations, Autochtones; cogestion; gouvernance; Nord; 
Yukon; Canada
 Traduit pour la revue Arctic par Nicole Giguère.
INTRODUCTION
A range of stressors challenges the integrity of food systems 
in Canada’s North, contributing to elevated rates of food 
insecurity within First Nations communities. Residents 
rely on a mix of market (store-bought) and traditional 
(wild-harvested) foods; however, traditional foods 
remain critically important, particularly in the context of 
limited access and prohibitive market food costs (Loring 
and Gerlach, 2015). Traditional foods provide a host of 
economic, social, dietary, cultural, and spiritual benefits 
(Loring and Gerlach, 2009); thus, maintaining ongoing 
availability of and access to key traditional food species is 
vital for ensuring food security.
Over the past decades, modern land claim agreements in 
Canada’s North have led to the creation of co-management 
boards, which include First Nations representation. 
Co-management arrangements are a form of collaborative 
governance for managing common-pool resources such as 
lands, water, fish, and wildlife, where control and authority 
is shared in some measure by governments and resource 
users (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Reed, 2008; Berkes, 
2009). Replacing the former top-down model of decision 
making, co-management allows the potential for First 
Nations to exert greater influence on policies and processes 
to manage the resources that support their traditional food 
systems (Loring and Gerlach, 2015). 
Land claim agreements, however, only specify the 
broad contours of relevant co-management arrangements. 
Co-management scholars have found that the actual 
workings of such regimes evolve out of a complex interplay 
among the co-managing partners over the course of 
time (Berkes, 2007; Armitage et al., 2009). Given the 
prevalence of co-management arrangements and their 
potential relevance for food security, it is surprising that 
very few studies on First Nations food security mention 
co-management as a mechanism through which food 
security can be enhanced (e.g., ICCA, 2015; Rosol et 
al., 2016), and analyses of the actual workings of such 
arrangements are limited. To better understand how 
participation in co-management arrangements can help or 
hinder First Nations in achieving the goal of food security, 
this study investigates the experiences of the Kluane First 
Nation (KFN) in co-managing its traditional territory with 
the Yukon Government (YG) and Parks Canada. 
This research uses theories and evidence from existing 
literature on co-management to interpret and analyze case 
study data from KFN in the context of food security. To 
understand the multiple perspectives on co-management 
of lands and wildlife in the area, our analysis focused on 
data from semi-structured interviews with political leaders, 
policymakers, and First Nations residents involved in 
these processes. Further, First Nations and government 
resources—including legislation, policy documents, and 
websites—were used to provide a more holistic context 
and interpretation. Our research shows that while the 
co-management system is imperfect, it does offer a 
mechanism through which First Nations can exert influence 
on decisions that affect their food security. 
FIRST NATIONS FOOD SECURITY,
TRADITIONAL FOODS, AND CO-MANAGEMENT
To provide a framework for this study, this section 
reviews the literature on both Indigenous food security 
(including First Nations, Inuit, Métis, and other global 
Indigenous groups) and co-management, and discusses how 
the latter can contribute to improving the former.
People, both individually and collectively, are deemed to 
be food secure when they “at all times, have physical, social, 
and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food 
which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for 
an active and healthy life” (FAO, 2015:53). Northern food 
security is predicated on four “pillars” and their stability 
over time. Namely, food must be available (supplied in 
the store or on the land), accessible (obtainable through 
physical, economic, social, or other means), of good quality 
(safe for consumption and of sufficient nutritional value), 
and usable (based on available food knowledge and skills, 
food equipment, and cultural preferences) (FAO, 1996; 
Wesche and Chan, 2010; Nunavut Food Security Coalition, 
2014; Kenny et al., 2018). For northern First Nations, the 
traditional food system plays a significant role (Loring and 
Gerlach, 2009; Walch et al., 2018). As such, traditional food 
security requires the “continued and predictable availability 
and access to food, derived from northern environments 
through Indigenous cultural practices” (Paci et al., 2004:1), 
and recognizes that maintaining traditional food systems 
and practices is not only important for dietary quality, but 
also for cultural reasons (Lambden et al., 2007; HSS, 2010; 
Kral et al., 2011; CCA, 2014; Desmarais and Wittman, 2014; 
KFN, 2014). For KFN members, for instance, “hunting is 
synonymous with life itself” (Nadasdy, 2003:63). Many 
still live by a modified version of the “annual round” of 
harvesting activities that they historically followed as semi-
nomadic people.
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…at a certain time in May, everyone is suddenly 
“hungry for grayling,” and they head en masse for 
the creek where they run. Soon after that, gophers 
emerge from their hibernation; everyone is “hungry for 
gophers,” and they head to Duke Meadow to set traps 
for them. And so it continues through the year—the 
annual round in modified form. 
(Nadasdy, 2003:68, 71) 
It is due to this continued reliance on traditional foods 
for both cultural and nutritional reasons that we have 
undertaken research exploring the opportunities that 
might exist for KFN to assert greater influence within the 
co-management system over policies that affect access to 
and availability of these foods. 
Rates of food insecurity in northern Indigenous 
communities are not only much higher than in the general 
population, but there is also a broadly shared concern that 
climate change is further stressing local food systems 
(CCA, 2014; IPCC, 2014). In a meta-analysis of the peer-
reviewed literature on food security in northern North 
America, remoteness, high food and fuel costs, and 
climate change were identified as important factors driving 
food insecurity; however, governance and policy were 
highlighted as the primary drivers (Loring and Gerlach, 
2015). While emphasizing the time-tested ability of 
northern peoples to effectively respond to environmental 
changes, barriers to access created by existing governance 
and policy regimes “were the most commonly raised issue 
for food security in the region” (Loring and Gerlach, 
2015:386). 
More specifically, food security scholars have identified 
top-down decision making (Loring et al., 2011; Loring 
and Gerlach, 2015), excessive regulation (Reedy, 2016), 
insufficient regulation (Theriault et al., 2005), and 
un(der)developed social networks with decision makers 
(McConney et al., 2015) as causes of food insecurity. 
For governance and policy to act as positive drivers for 
northern Indigenous food security, the emerging paradigm 
underscores the need for more collaborative governance 
and more inclusive, locally-driven decision making.  
Proponents of the related food sovereignty movement 
emphasize “that decisions about food systems should be 
made by those who depend on them” (CCA, 2014:13). 
Popularized by the international peasant organization, 
Via Campesina, in the context of agricultural societies, 
food sovereignty entails “the right of each nation to 
maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its 
basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity” 
(Jarosz, 2014:173). There are now several organizations in 
Canada approaching food sovereignty from an Indigenous 
perspective, with a focus on traditional foods (Desmarais 
and Wittman, 2014). In the northern context, movement 
toward food sovereignty requires that Indigenous 
communities be involved in land, wildlife, and resource 
policy decisions that affect local food systems. 
Over the past few decades, modern land claim 
agreements with Inuit and First Nations groups in 
Canada’s North have given rise to the institutionalization 
of new governance arrangements that involve Indigenous 
representatives in decision-making processes regarding 
wildlife, resource development, and conservation on their 
traditional territories (Berkes, 2009; Natcher, 2013; Staples 
and Natcher, 2015). While these agreements offer a formal 
framework for more collaborative and local governance, 
they do not give Indigenous groups the degree of decision-
making power over their traditional territories warranted 
by a strong definition of food sovereignty (see case study 
context for further explanation of the new governance 
structure). We use the term “food security” because the 
concept better aligns with our research aim, which is to 
understand how First Nations can and do use the present 
governance structure to improve the continued availability 
of and their access to traditional foods. Adopting the 
concept of food sovereignty would also naturally expand the 
focus to include changing the formal governance structure. 
While this is a very important subject, the present system, 
achieved through decades-long negotiations (with some 
negotiations still ongoing), may not see any formal changes 
in the foreseeable future. 
At present, there are no studies on food security that 
analyze in what form and to what extent collaborative 
and more localized governance regimes help to achieve 
food security in general, and specifically, in northern 
First Nations communities (Loring and Gerlach, 2015). 
This research contributes to filling this gap by analyzing 
how First Nations communities try to enhance their food 
security as participants in collaborative and more localized 
governance arrangements, thereby also assessing to what 
degree and under which circumstances such participation 
helps or hinders the achievement of food security. In our 
analysis, we apply theories and evidence from research 
on co-management to the context of First Nations food 
security. Co-management scholars define co-management 
as a collaborative governance approach for managing 
common-pool resources, such as land, water, fish, and 
wildlife (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Reed, 2008; Berkes, 
2009) within a structure that involves the “sharing of 
power and responsibility between the government and 
local resource users” (Berkes et al., 1991:12). Numerous 
studies have evaluated the successes and failures of 
co-management in achieving goals such as conservation, 
environmental resilience, sustainable resource use, and 
successful livelihood strategies (e.g., Berkes, 2007, 2009; 
Armitage et al., 2009; Evans et al., 2011; Wamukota et al., 
2012); however, there has been limited focus on the goal of 
food security to date. 
The food security literature includes only a few 
publications that specifically mention co-management as a 
mechanism through which food security can be enhanced. 
Furthermore, none of these studies examine the actual 
workings of such arrangements. In their investigation 
of nutrient intake among the Inuit in Canada’s Arctic, 
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Rosol et al. (2016) suggest that a co-management agency 
may help increase access to traditional foods. The food 
security report published by the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council – Alaska specifically mentions co-management as 
a tool to support environmental health, which in turn, is 
key to achieving food security (ICCA, 2015). Tapping into 
the rich knowledge from the co-management literature, 
which also includes many studies analyzing the governance 
of common-pool resources in northern communities, 
thus seems a promising avenue to learn how this more 
collaborative and more localized governance in northern 
Canada can contribute to First Nations food security. 
Moreover, the insight that First Nations representatives 
in Canada could use the language of food security and 
identify it as a target outcome in their efforts to exercise 
influence on decision-making through the new governance 
bodies is relatively recent. Finally, a better understanding of 
how to achieve food security through current governance 
arrangements in northern Canada is also relevant for 
co-management research because the choice of target 
outcomes may also influence the stability and success of 
the governance arrangement (for instance, through shifts 
in the balance of power between participants or additional 
opportunities for coalition building).
The co-management literature analyzes collaborative 
governance arrangements that are diverse, complex, 
and dynamic. Some arrangements are successful while 
others are not, thus requiring an in-depth understanding 
to assess the conditions under which an arrangement 
may be successful (Berkes, 2007). Over recent decades, 
co-management research has highlighted that such 
arrangements have different dimensions (Berkes, 
2007). Some dimensions focus on the desired outcome 
or consequences of co-management such as institution 
building, trust building, problem solving, and social 
learning, while other dimensions focus on the nature of 
the arrangement, namely power sharing, process, and 
governance. The different dimensions of a co-management 
arrangement are interdependent. Power sharing, for 
instance, is the result of a continuous problem-solving 
process involving joint learning (Carlsson and Berkes, 
2005). A more recent insight in the literature is that 
co-management arrangements are adaptive and must evolve 
to become and remain successful (Berkes, 2007, 2009; 
Armitage et al., 2009). Through cycles of learning-by-
doing, maturing arrangements become adaptive over time. 
Those that do not adapt often fail (Berkes, 2009). 
In managing common-pool resources, co-management 
arrangements may capture benefits that top-down 
arrangements cannot (Feeny et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990; 
Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). Potential benefits include 
the distribution of tasks, the exchange of resources, 
coordination of actions through the linking of different 
types and levels of organization, the reduction of transaction 
costs, the sharing of risks, and the use of conflict resolution 
mechanisms (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005).
The co-management literature stresses both the 
importance of context and of more controllable factors in 
contributing to successful co-management arrangements. 
Ostrom (1990) identifies a range of situational factors that 
influence the likelihood that a decentralized governance 
arrangement such as co-management arises and endures: 
size of the common-pool resource and its current state, 
number of users, heterogeneity of user interests, relational 
connections among users, skills and assets of leaders, and 
history (e.g., conflict, past strategies of users). Adaptive 
co-management scholars Armitage et al. (2009) echo 
some of these environmental conditions as relevant for 
successful adaptive co-management; however, they also 
identify factors that can be altered or influenced, such 
as the commitment to support a long-term institution-
building process, the provision of training and resources for 
stakeholders, an openness of participants to share and draw 
upon a plurality of knowledge systems and resources, and 
a policy environment that explicitly supports collaborative 
management efforts. Berkes (2009) further identifies 
a range of strategies that have been shown to foster 
collaborative, participatory, democratic, and accountable 
relationships among diverse stakeholders. These include 
participatory research, the co-production of knowledge, and 
collaborative monitoring.
In the context of Canada’s North, Nadasdy (2003) rightly 
cautioned against uncritical acceptance of co-management 
successes, and numerous challenges have been identified 
during the early years of these regimes (Stevenson, 2004; 
Nadasdy, 2005). However, much of the recent literature 
continues to be excessively critical and overlooks the 
significant gains that have been and continue to be made in 
this realm (Clark and Joe-Strack, 2017). Co-management is 
not easy, and current regimes in the North may fall short of 
the nation-to-nation relationship ideal; however, they do offer 
a formal and evolving space for local participation in policy 
development and implementation. 
Research indicates that co-management arrangements 
take years if not decades to develop, and most successful 
efforts transpire under the umbrella of a (conducive) formal 
arrangement (Ostrom 1990; Berkes, 2007; Armitage et al., 
2009). The co-management literature thus offers a valuable 
theoretical lens through which to deepen our understanding 
of how local participants in Canada’s northern 
co-management bodies can increase their influence within 
the present system to strengthen food security. In the 
results and discussion section of this paper, we rely on this 




KFN is based in Burwash Landing, a small community 
of 108 people (Yukon Government, 2017) located 285 km 
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northwest of Whitehorse, Yukon, along the shores of 
Kluane Lake. KFN traditional territory (Fig. 1) is home 
to the Lù’àn Män Ku Dän, the Kluane Lake People, most 
of whom are descendants of Southern Tutchone speakers 
(KFN, 2019). 
KFN is an ideal case study as its members continue to 
rely heavily on traditional food. At the same time, access 
to store-bought food remains limited, with the closest fully 
stocked grocery store located three hours away by car. KFN 
gained governance influence with the 2003 signing of its 
land claim agreement, which enabled province-like powers 
over Settlement Lands. Local government representatives 
and citizens now participate on various boards and 
councils that advise on issues affecting KFN traditional 
territory, including those related to the availability of 
and access to traditional food (Fred, 2008:3). The overlap 
between Kluane National Park and Reserve (KNPR) and 
KFN territory adds another governance relationship, thus 
allowing for the analysis of a broad variety of collaborative 
governance arrangements. Finally and importantly, food 
security is a policy priority for KFN. Its government 
has taken concrete policy steps to bolster food security, 
including the development of its own food security strategy, 
entitled Nourishing Our Future: An Adaptive Food Security 
Strategy to Ensure the Cultural and Physical Well-Being 
of the Kluane First Nation Against the Impacts of Climate 
Change in the Yukon. This document identifies key focal 
areas and associated actions for moving the community 
toward ongoing sustainability of the local food system 
(KFN, 2014). 
Collaboration with KFN
This research was inspired by KFN’s food security 
strategy, and aims to investigate opportunities for KFN 
(and other First Nations) to advance their traditional food 
security within the existing Yukon governance structure. 
In undertaking this participatory study, the researchers 
engaged with KFN throughout, initially by proposing the 
research to community leaders and requesting permission 
to undertake the study on KFN lands. KFN supported the 
research and agreed to participate, aiming to complement 
their food security strategy implementation process. A 
research agreement between the primary researcher (lead 
author) and KFN was subsequently developed and signed 
by both parties. The agreement specified KFN ownership 
FIG. 1. Kluane First Nation traditional territory, showing Category A and B lands and the overlap with Kluane National Park and Reserve. KFN has exclusive 
jurisdiction in the KFN core area and shares jurisdiction with White River First Nation in the KFN/WRFN secondary area. 
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of all information collected in its traditional territory and 
allowed use of the material by the researchers for a limited 
time. KFN supported the application for a Yukon Research 
License, which was approved. Ethical approval was 
obtained from the University of Ottawa. 
Throughout the fieldwork, writing, and review stages 
of this research, we engaged with KFN government 
representatives, seeking their comments and incorporating 
their feedback. To validate our findings, interviewees 
had the opportunity to review and provide feedback on 
the comments attributed to them, as well as contextual 
paragraphs that immediately preceded or followed 
their comments. A community report was provided 
to KFN leadership and made available to community 
members at a Research Summit in Burwash Landing, and 
KFN government staff co-authored and reviewed this 
manuscript. 
As researchers, our perspectives are multifaceted. 
Cruickshank, of settler origins, worked as a political 
reporter for a Whitehorse newspaper before returning to 
graduate school and conducting the research described here. 
During her fieldwork period, she simultaneously worked 
with the Arctic Institute of Community-Based Research 
(AICBR) and KFN on a community-driven project to 
implement components of the KFN Food Security Strategy, 
which reinforced her understandings and relationships. 
Notten has strong research experience related to policy and 
governance, with a focus on poverty. Wesche has over a 
decade of experience working with northern First Nations 
communities, including Old Crow, Yukon, and has previous 
links with AICBR. Ballegooyen and Pope live and work in 
Burwash Landing, bringing their perspective as residents 
and KFN employees. Ballegooyen, a settler originally from 
Saskatchewan, works as Natural Resources Manager for 
KFN. While her primary focus is development assessment, 
she also facilitates research projects throughout the KFN 
Traditional Territory, and is dedicated to community 
building, believing that collaborative work and action will 
enable the transition to local food security. Pope, a Ta’an 
Kwäch’än Council citizen, has an intimate knowledge of 
KFN traditional territory through her work as the KFN 
Lands, Resources and Heritage Director, and as a Canadian 
Ranger. She oversees the KFN wildlife-monitoring 
program, as well as the trapper’s incentive program. 
Data Collection
As indicated above, we analyzed the case study data in 
light of the theories and evidence from the co-management 
literature. For the remainder of this paper we therefore 
use the term “co-management” to refer to the various 
collaborative governance arrangements in which KFN 
is involved. These include formal and continuous 
arrangements such as participation in councils and boards, 
as well as related interactions (formal, informal, project-
based) between KFN staff and other co-management 
organizations (e.g., YG and Parks Canada), which were 
identified by interviewees as relevant to traditional food 
security.
Our analysis relied on data collected through semi-
structured interviews and through a review of publicly 
available resources published by First Nations and federal 
and territorial governments such as legislation, land 
claim agreements, and policy document. These offered 
information about the case study context in general, and 
more specifically, the formal governance context. Fieldwork 
for this research took place between June and August 
2015, in Whitehorse (territorial capital) and in the smaller 
communities of Burwash Landing and Destruction Bay, in 
KFN traditional territory. Interviews were conducted with 23 
political leaders, policy makers, and citizens with knowledge 
of specific co-management arrangements regarding lands 
and wildlife. Of these, 18 were analyzed in detail for this 
study (Table 1), while the remaining five provided important 
background context. Contributing participants included 
representatives from the following organizations: KFN (7), 
YG (5), Government of Canada (1), and co-management 
bodies (5), including the Land Use Planning Council and the 
Dän Keyi Renewable Resources Council. Interviewees were 
identified and contacted based largely on their employment 
position and level of involvement in wildlife management, 
land and resource management, or issues related to food 
security. Some interviewees were also identified through 
snowball sampling. 
TABLE 1. Interviewee affiliations and reference codes.
Organization Interviewee position Interviewee code
Kluane First Nation Staff Members: Lands, Resources and Heritage Department KFN1, KFN2, KFN3
 KFN Chief (now former)  Mathieya Alatini
 Citizens familiar with land and resource management  Mary Jane Johnson, KFN6
 Citizen and former Land Claims Negotiator KFN7
Yukon Government Staff Members: Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Mineral Resources Branch YG1, YG2
 Staff members: Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Oil and Gas Resources Branch YG3
 Regional Biologist: Environment Yukon, Fish and Wildlife Branch YG4
 Environmental Assessment Officer: Environment Yukon, Environmental Programs Branch  YG5
Government of Canada Staff Member: Kluane National Park and Reserve  PRK1
Co-management Organizations Executive Director, Member: Dän Keyi Renewable Resources Council CM1, CM2
 Director: Yukon Land Use Planning Council CM3
 Staff Member: Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board CM4
 Environmental Assessment Practitioner: familiar with Yukon Environmental and  CM5
 Socio-Economic Assessment Act
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We used an exploratory approach, where we sought 
to identify and better understand the ways in which 
co-management of land, wildlife, and resources may 
affect traditional food security, and the opportunities 
and challenges these regimes may present for KFN (and 
potentially other First Nations) as it exerts authority over 
the management of its traditional food system. To this end, 
interview questions were open-ended and varied somewhat 
depending on the position of the interviewee. Questions 
for interviewees who were either citizens or employees 
of KFN focused on how KFN contributes to land and 
wildlife management in its traditional territory and how 
food security is considered within those processes. They 
also addressed existing challenges regarding both KFN’s 
participation in co-management and the consideration of 
food security in these processes, as well as opportunities 
for strengthening co-management in KFN traditional 
territory. Interviewees employed by YG were asked how 
their department considers First Nations food security in 
policy development and what opportunities First Nation 
governments have to inf luence policy development. 
Interviewees familiar with the Yukon environmental and 
socio-economic assessment process were asked how food 
security is considered in assessment processes, whether 
the organization proactively assesses impacts on food 
security, and how projects have been dealt with in the 
case of food security concerns. Interviewees involved in 
land-use planning in the territory were asked how food 
security is considered during those processes. A Parks 
Canada employee was also asked about the nature of the 
co-management of KNPR (see Appendix 1 online for 
interview questions). All participants reviewed and signed 
consent forms, indicating their preference for identification 
in research outputs, either by name, professional position, 
or organization and sector. Participant comments in the text 
are cited using the interviewee codes in Table 1.
Data Analysis
Interviews for this study were audio-recorded and later 
transcribed and coded using both inductive and deductive 
approaches in Dedoose qualitative data management 
software (Dedoose, 2017). We applied an inductive 
approach to a first round of open coding (Lune and Berg, 
2017) using keywords to indicate when an excerpt was 
related to KFN context, food security, traditional foods, 
specific foods (e.g., moose, a significant source of meat for 
KFN), the entity being co-managed (e.g., lands, wildlife), 
the organization involved (YG, Parks Canada, KFN, other 
First Nations governments, or co-management bodies), 
the mentioning of specific concerns from the First Nation 
perspective (e.g., familiarity of YG employees with 
the Final Agreements, or public sharing of traditional 
knowledge), and the responses or additional context related 
to those concerns provided from YG or co-management 
organization interviews. Keywords were also used to 
code excerpts related to co-management benefits and 
successes, co-management challenges, and examples of 
noticeable differences in perspective (i.e., perspectives on 
the highway corridor). 
We subsequently performed a second round of coding 
by concepts and themes using Berkes’ (2007) seven 
dimensions of co-management as a framework (i.e., if 
a comment related to power sharing, trust building, or 
another element). Then we organized the excerpts coded 
by Berkes’ seven dimensions according to the following 
questions: 1) How is co-management working? 2) What 
factors are important for a functioning co-management 
arrangement? 3) How can KFN’s influence be strengthened 
to improve their ability to protect traditional food sources? 
Three key themes emerged: trust and relationship building, 
information sharing, and power sharing. In the results and 
discussion section, we interpret these themes in light of 
the theories and evidence offered by the co-management 
literature, drawing particularly from publications that 
synthesize insights from a large body of case studies and 
those that focus on co-management in the North. 
CASE STUDY CONTEXT
To understand how KFN influences the food security of 
its citizens through various co-management arrangements, 
this section offers a background on contextual aspects that 
co-management researchers identify as relevant: the formal 
institutions (rules) guiding co-management in northern 
Canada, the formal possibilities of using food security as 
a legitimate policy goal of co-management in northern 
Canada, the co-management arrangements in which KFN 
is engaged, and the food security context for KFN (Table 2).
Formal Institutions Guiding Co-management in Northern 
Canada
The formal governance system in northern Canada has 
changed significantly since the 1970s, undergoing what 
Coates and Poelzer (2014:4) term a “revolution”. In this time, 
both territorial and Indigenous governments gained new 
responsibilities through devolution and the establishment 
of self-government agreements and comprehensive, 
constitutionally protected land claim agreements (Pomeroy 
and Berkes, 1997; White, 2002; Coates and Poelzer, 2014). 
These agreements are complex and extensive. For this study 
in particular, they tend to involve the formal recognition 
of Indigenous ownership of a portion of the land covered 
by the claim in exchange for the release of territorial title 
(White, 2002). Importantly, Indigenous signatories tend 
to retain hunting rights, which are critical for traditional 
food procurement, throughout the territory covered by the 
claim (White, 2002). Indigenous governments also tend to 
gain formal representation on land and resource boards, 
which advise territorial governments on issues that may 
affect access to and the availability of traditional foods 
(White, 2002). These co-management boards typically 
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serve in an advisory role, making recommendations to 
the relevant decision-maker on issues related to land and 
natural resources (White, 2008). In the Yukon, these 
decision-makers include YG or, in cases where Settlement 
Lands are involved, a self-governing First Nation. White 
(2008:74) argues that, despite a “lack (of) final decision-
making authority…this advisory function is a far more 
potent prerogative than might be thought.” In order for a 
government to reject or modify a board’s recommendations, 
“ministers must expend their political resources (including 
laying out their objections in writing) and must do so 
quickly, or the land-claim board’s recommendations come 
into effect by default” (White, 2008:74).
In Yukon, YG, self-governing First Nations, and the 
federal government share control of the territory. YG 
controls by far the largest area, but is required to consult 
Yukon First Nations (YFNs) regarding policy decisions 
that could impact their traditional territories. In 1993, 
YG, Government of Canada, and the Council of Yukon 
Indians (now the Council of Yukon First Nations) signed 
the Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA), setting the stage 
for the territory’s 14 First Nations to finalize land claim 
and self-government agreements (Alcantara et al., 2012). 
Today, 11 of Yukon’s 14 First Nations, including KFN, have 
concluded such agreements. The UFA also precipitated 
the creation of several co-management boards that include 
formal representation by YFNs (Alcantara et al., 2012) 
and established a formal process for YFNs and YG to 
develop regional land use plans (Council for Yukon Indians, 
Government of Canada and Yukon Government, 1993). 
KFN’s final and self-government agreements were 
signed in October 2003 (Fred, 2008). KFN Settlement 
Lands include 647.5 km2 of Category A land, which 
includes both surface and sub-surface rights, as well as 
259 km2 of Category B land, which only includes surface 
rights (Fig. 1) (Fred, 2008). KFN is the decision-maker for 
its Settlement Lands, Parks Canada is the decision-maker 
for KNPR, and YG is the decision-maker for other lands in 
KFN traditional territory.
Food Security as a Co-Management Goal
Multiple chapters in the KFN Final Agreement 
include objectives that relate to traditional food system 
sustainability. Chapter 12 provides for a development 
assessment process that “protects and promotes the well-
being of Yukon Indian People and of their communities 
and of other Yukon residents and the interests of other 
Canadians” and “protects and maintains environmental 
quality and ensures that Projects are undertaken consistent 
with the principles of Sustainable Development” (KFN et 
al., 2003:171). Chapter 14 addresses water management. 
Clause 14.8.1 indicates that “…a Yukon First Nation has 
the right to have Water which is on or flowing through 
or adjacent to its Settlement Lands remain substantially 
unaltered as to quantity, quality, and rate of flow, including 
seasonal rate of flow” (KFN et al., 2003:213); this has 
been used by KFN to protect fish spawning habitats from 
industrial development (Interviewee KFN3, 2019). Chapter 
16 addresses fish and wildlife, outlining three objectives 
relevant to food security: “to ensure conservation in the 
management of all Fish and Wildlife resources and their 
habitats,” “to preserve and enhance the culture, identity and 
values of Yukon Indian People,” and “to ensure the equal 
participation of Yukon Indian People with other Yukon 
residents in Fish and Wildlife management processes and 
decisions” (KFN et al., 2003:231).
At the national level, Canada’s constitution recognizes 
both a right to food and current and future treaty rights 
(Hanson, 2009; CCA, 2014). Various Supreme Court of 
Canada decisions have determined these rights to include 
among other things, the right to land, fishing, and hunting. 
These are rights that have direct implications for First 
Nations food security (Hanson, 2009).
KFN Engagement in Co-management
KFN is engaged in several formal and informal 
co-management arrangements involving various 
co-management partners, of which Parks Canada and YG 
are primary, because they have formal jurisdiction over the 
non-settlement parts of KFN traditional territory (Fig. 1) 
(Parks Canada, 2010; KFN et al., 2003). 
The first group of co-management arrangements 
includes those institutionalized by the modern land claim 
agreements. These agreements require First Nations 
representation on any of the numerous technical advisory 
committees and management committees focused on 
wildlife. Those of particular relevance for First Nations 
food security include the Yukon Environmental and Socio-
economic Assessment Board (YESAB), the Yukon Fish and 
Wildlife Management Board, the Renewable Resources 
Councils, and the Yukon Land Use Planning Council. 
Below, we briefly discuss each.
The Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic 
Assessment Act (YESAA) applies to all Yukon lands; it 
addresses the requirements under Chapter 12 of the UFA 
for a development assessment process. The purpose of the 
Act is to ensure that environmental and socio-economic 
effects of projects are assessed before activities proceed. 
The arms-length YESAB conducts the assessments and 
guarantees opportunities for First Nations and public 
participation. The YESAB has to notify affected First 
Nations when a development project goes through the 
YESAA process (Interviewee CM5, 2015). While food 
security is not commonly considered as a value in itself 
through the assessment process, it is considered implicitly 
through consideration of how a project may affect wildlife 
populations (Interviewee CM5, 2015). One interviewee 
familiar with the assessment process indicated that food 
security would likely be more directly considered if it 
were raised more often as a concern through public or First 
Nations input (Interviewee CM5, 2015).
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The work of the Yukon Fish and Wildlife 
Management Board is similarly relevant in that it makes 
recommendations related to fish and wildlife management, 
which may affect the availability of traditional food sources. 
Required under the UFA, it is “the primary instrument for 
Fish and Wildlife Management in the Yukon” (Council for 
Yukon Indians et al., 1993:166). The Board, comprised of 
members nominated by both YG and the Council of Yukon 
First Nations, makes recommendations to decision-makers 
(YG, First Nations, or Federal Government) regarding fish 
and wildlife policies and legislation based on scientific 
and traditional knowledge (Yukon Fish and Wildlife 
Management Board, 2019). 
The Renewable Resource Councils and local 
management bodies also advise the Yukon Fish and 
Wildlife Management Board and all levels of government 
on issues related to the management of land, fish, and 
wildlife within land claim areas, and thus may, through 
their work, have an effect on traditional food availability. 
The Dän Keyi Renewable Resources Council undertakes 
this function in KFN territory.
The Yukon Land Use Planning Council assists in the 
coordination of regional land use planning and is required 
to recognize and promote First Nations values. Due to its 
territorial scope, land use planning offers an opportunity 
to look at wildlife land management at a larger geographic 
scale and thereby identify areas critical to the protection of 
traditional food sources, regardless of whether these areas 
are subject to overlapping or intersecting governmental 
jurisdiction. 
A second group of co-management arrangements, many 
of which have no formal institutional backing, constitute 
the direct relationships that KFN maintains with YG and 
Parks Canada. For instance, KFN maintains a working 
TABLE 2. Key organizations and mandates. 
Organization
Kluane First Nation, Lands, 
Resources and Heritage Department 
Department of Energy, 
Mines and Resources, 
Mineral Resources Branch
 
Department of Energy, 
Mines and Resources, 
Oil and Gas Resources Branch
 
Environment Yukon, 




Kluane National Park and Reserve 
Dän Keyi Renewable Resources Council
 
Land Use Planning Council
Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management 
Board









The Lands, Resources and Heritage Department implements the KFN Final 
Agreement relating to Settlement Lands and the use of natural resources and 
heritage in the traditional territory. It aims to maintain land that can sustain 
traditional uses and healthy fish and wildlife populations (KFN, 2019).
The Mineral Resources Branch regulates and promotes mineral exploration and 
development in the Yukon (EMR, 2018a).
The Oil and Gas Resources Branch regulates and promotes development of the 
territory’s oil and gas resources (EMR, 2018b).
The Fish and Wildlife Branch is responsible for monitoring fish and wildlife 
populations, habitat, wildlife, and harvest management (Environment Yukon, 
2017). 
The Environmental Programs Branch analyzes potential environmental impacts, 
monitors contaminated sites, remediates government-owned contaminated sites, 
and issues permits for regulated activities (Environment Yukon, 2017).
Parks Canada’s mandate includes the protection of national parks and the 
enhancement of public understanding to ensure future protection (Parks 
Canada, 2018).
Established through Yukon First Nation Final Agreements, RRCs provide local 
input for managing fish and wildlife within the relevant traditional territory. The 
Dän Keyi RRC provides opportunities for public consultation and makes non-
binding recommendations to Yukon Government, Kluane First Nation,the Yukon 
Fish and Wildlife Management Board, and the Salmon Sub-Committee (Yukon 
Government, 2018).
The Land Use Planning Council makes recommendations to First Nations and 
Yukon Government about land use planning as outlined in the Final Agreements 
(Yukon Land Use Planning Council, 2018).
The Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board is recognized in the UFA 
as the primary instrument of fish and wildlife management in the Yukon. It 
provides for public consultation and makes recommendations to the Minister, 
First Nations, or the Federal Government based on a combination of technical, 
traditional, and local knowledge (Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board, 
2019).
The Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic Assessment Board assesses 
proposed development projects as required by the Final Agreements (YESAB, 
2012).
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relationship with various YG departments, as well as 
its political arm. One interviewee credited KFN Chief 
Alatini’s efforts to build relationships with YG, which 
enables KFN employees to call up relevant ministers to 
address issues as they arise (Interviewee KFN1, 2015). 
KFN members participate in the Kluane National Park 
Management Board, which makes recommendations 
to the Minister of Environment Canada (Interviewee 
KFN1, 2015), and also connects informally with KNPR 
employees. KFN representatives participate in activities in 
the National Park including wildlife population counts, and 
Parks Canada employees regularly attend KFN community 
meetings (Interviewee KFN1, 2015). 
Food Security Context for KFN
KFN members continue to rely heavily on food from 
the land, particularly kanäy (moose, Alces alces), mäy 
(thinhorn sheep, Ovis dalli), mbet (lake trout, Salvelinus 
namaycush), lù (lake whitefish, Coregonus clupeaformis), 
and t’äwa (Arctic grayling, Thymallus arcticus) (KFN, 
2014; Interviewee KFN3, 2018). While “…people out in the 
communities look at the land as a provider” (M.J. Johnson, 
2015), KFN members face challenges in procuring 
sufficient, culturally preferred traditional food. Access to 
protected spaces is one challenge: “… access to [Kluane 
National] park is very limited. There are only a few roads 
that access the park and, of those few roads, even [fewer] 
… go to areas where you may want to harvest things” 
(Interviewee PRK1, 2015). 
Resource development represents another potential 
threat to KFN’s food security. The exploration and 
development company, Nickel Creek Platinum Corporation 
(formerly Wellgreen Platinum Ltd.), has long expressed 
interest in developing an open-pit platinum mine on KFN 
traditional territory in an area that includes sensitive sheep 
habitat (Interviewee CM5, 2015). 
Climate change is an additional stressor. For example, 
by stimulating the growth of trees and taller grasses, it is 
perceived to be affecting Arctic ground squirrel populations 
(Urocitellus parryii; commonly known as “gophers”), which 
thrive in open meadow habitat (Interviewee KFN2, 2015). 
Investigations of ground squirrel population declines in the 
region have highlighted factors such as increased predation 
risk due to both shrub encroachment in tundra and forest 
habitats, and low snowshoe hare populations in boreal forest 
habitat, which shifts predator pressure to ground squirrels 
(Hik et al., 2001; Donker and Krebs, 2012; Wheeler and Hik, 
2014; Werner et al., 2015). In addition to these biophysical 
stressors, a shift away from certain traditional management 
practices is also perceived to affect the availability of wild 
food species, including ground squirrels. 
Duke Meadow used to be an area where people went 
to harvest gophers all the time, and as part of that 
practice, there was some maintenance that took place. 
… My grandmother would always pull the spruce trees 
and the willows … to try to maintain it as a meadow 
so that the gophers would stay there. No one does that 
anymore, so you can see that it’s really like growing 
in. So, eventually that meadow’s gonna be gone, and 
the gophers will probably go with it because we’re not 
maintaining that sort of same traditional way. 
(Interviewee KFN7, 2015)
To protect its wild food sources, KFN is actively engaged 
in efforts to manage its traditional territory through the 
various co-management arrangements described earlier: 
“We are stewards of the land and we have a responsibility 
to manage wildlife and the ecosystem that supports the 
wildlife in a sustainable manner” (Alatini, 2015). 
In 2014, KFN developed a local food security strategy 
in collaboration with the Arctic Institute of Community-
Based Research (KFN, 2014; Alatini, 2015; AICBR, 2017) 
in response to declining moose and caribou populations and 
in recognition of limited grocery store access. The three-
year project, partially funded by Health Canada, identified 
ways in which the community could adapt to climatic and 
lifestyle changes, supporting ongoing sustainability of the 
local food system (KFN, 2014). 
[The food security strategy is] a useful document 
because it shares the community’s views on certain 
topics, which gives the government something to refer 
to, especially when at times it can be difficult to get 
members out to community meetings. 
(Interviewee KFN2, 2015) 
A strategic plan not only signals a policy priority, but 
the act of identifying goals and actions can also help a 
government establish organizational focus and coordinate 
internal efforts (Notten and Laforest, 2016). While KFN’s 
(2014) food security strategy does not directly address the 
government’s participation on co-management boards, it 
details community-identified recommendations related to 
land, wildlife, and resource management. These include 
recommendations to: 
• Promote and encourage conservation and protection of 
Kluane First Nation traditional territory. 
• Continue monitoring key areas showing signs of climate 
change in the KFN territory, as well as the effects on 
traditional food resources in these areas. …
• Encourage ancient methods of conservation for 
declining animal populations, such as moose, caribou, 
sheep and trout (i.e., no hunting in specific areas for a 
period of time to allow for replenishment of fish and 
wildlife populations). …
• Look for ways to have greater control over hunting and 
conservation in Kluane First Nation traditional territory.
KFN has direct influence over these policy areas at the 
scale of its Settlement Lands; however, at the larger scale 
of its traditional territory, these are the shared purview of 
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KFN, Parks Canada, YG, and co-management bodies. 
Thus, in order to effectively act on these recommendations, 
KFN is likely to require the cooperation of its co-managers. 
Finally, an advantage for KFN is that its policy goal 
of food security aligns very well with a key goal of Parks 
Canada, the lead player in co-managing a sizable part of 
KFN traditional territory:
Parks’ objective is trying to enhance or trying 
to preserve … wild food sources. So, there’s no 
development in the park; there’s all these protectionist 
types of legislation, as well as in the Final Agreements 
to protect those very things. 
(Interviewee PRK1, 2015)
KFN is pretty lucky in the sense that there’s a lot of 
protected areas in their traditional territory, with the 
Game Sanctuary and the Kluane National Park, and 
the Asi Keyi Territorial Sanctuary … we’ll still be able 
to practice subsistence hunting and, you know, berry 
harvesting and all that in those areas. 
(Interviewee KFN7, 2015)
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section analyzes the interview data through the lens of 
the co-management literature with the aim of understanding 
how KFN engagement in co-management contributes to 
food security for its citizens. The three key themes emerging 
from this research are trust and relationship building, 
information sharing, and power sharing. Within these three 
themes, the analysis also highlights the role of specific 
elements in the case study context—called situational factors 
in co-management research—whose presence is known to 
facilitate or hinder collaboration. Finally, the analysis also 
reveals some more tacit and practitioner-oriented insights as 
to how to make co-management work better in the context of 
Canada’s North.
Trust and Relationship Building
The first theme emerging from the interviews was 
trust building as a necessary foundation, without which 
none of the expected benefits from collaboration could 
materialize. The co-management literature identifies trust 
and relationship building as a determinant for success in 
co-management, recognizing their importance for effective 
communication (Berkes, 2007). Likewise, participants in 
our study emphasized the importance of trust as a prelude 
to effective working relationships. 
It is Mathieya’s efforts; it’s our (former) chief that’s been 
able to get those relationships, to build it to the point that 
they respect Kluane First Nation enough to call and say, 
“Okay what is your issue and how can we help you?” … 
If they can’t, then they’ll say, “We can’t help you on that 
one” … so we can understand it. So, it depends on the 
relationship that you build and the trust level that you 
have. 
(Interviewee KFN1, 2015)
Similarly, trust building was also credited for the 
strength of KFN’s relationship with Parks Canada 
compared to the relationship with YG: “I think maybe it’s 
the trust thing, and you can actually see it happening; it’s 
tangible.” (Interviewee KFN1, 2015)
Building trust is especially relevant and challenging 
when co-management partners have very different 
worldviews and when historic experiences and injustices 
have created mistrust, as is the case between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous communities (Ostrom, 1990; Manseau 
et al., 2005; Berkes, 2007). KFN’s relationship with Parks 
Canada illustrates how multiple concurrent approaches 
and activities can support the building and maintenance of 
trust between parties, and that this is key to establishing 
a functional working relationship, particularly when 
influenced by a challenging history. 
Respondents from KFN and Parks Canada describe their 
current working relationship as very positive. KFN leaders 
meet regularly with Parks Canada representatives and are 
informed about activities taking place in the Park. KFN 
representatives participate regularly on the Kluane National 
Park Management Board, which makes recommendations 
to the federal Minister of Environment and Climate Change 
on Park management matters. KFN staff members also 
commonly take flights with Parks employees to conduct 
moose and sheep population counts (Interviewee KFN1, 
2015).
However, the evolution of the relationship between KNPR 
and neighbouring First Nations, including KFN, has been 
long and arduous. With the establishment of the Kluane 
Game Sanctuary in 1943, KFN members and others were 
legally prevented from carrying out traditional hunting, 
trapping, and gathering activities within its borders. Removal 
from this portion of KFN traditional territory disrupted 
local knowledge systems, which were rooted in physical 
and spiritual connections with the land (Parks Canada, 
2010). This had deeply negative effects on the community, 
causing food shortages and profoundly influencing hunting 
patterns and seasonal movements (Nadasdy, 2003). In 1976, 
the Sanctuary became Kluane National Park and Reserve 
under the federal Parks Act. While the Act allowed for the 
continuation of traditional harvesting activities, there was 
lack of clarity as to whether this stipulation applied, since 
local First Nation citizens had not harvested in the area for 
30 years (Zanasi, 2005). As such, the effective displacement 
of KFN citizens from KNPR continued until 2003 when 
traditional harvesting rights were confirmed through the 
KFN Final Agreement. Impacts of this legacy persist 
(Nadasdy, 2003; Clark et al., 2014).
There was no trust between Parks Canada and either 
First Nation. … Parks Canada had a very protectionist, 
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exclusionary policy in the 70s and the 80s. … The RCMP 
and Parks Canada had made arrests, or made efforts to 
remove people from the Park, and it wasn’t [a situation 
that was] welcoming for traditional activities like 
hunting and fishing. … It’s a small community … and 
people have long memories and … they had some bad 
relations as a result. … Just because a Final Agreement 
was signed and lawyers negotiated rights for First 
Nations within the park, this didn’t make it suddenly 
okay for people to feel comfortable to re-enter the Park 
or do things. Even though they had full right and were 
aware of it, [they just weren’t] comfortable being in the 
Park and being around the Parks Canada uniforms even.
(Interviewee PRK1, 2015)
In the period before land claim agreements were 
finalized, the establishment and management of KNPR was 
conducted with limited First Nation input despite significant 
subsistence and economic impacts on these populations. 
The 2003 ratification of the KFN Final Agreement resulted 
in the creation of the Dän Keyi Renewable Resources 
Council and membership on the Kluane National Park 
Management Board (joining Champagne and Aishihik 
First Nations, whose Final Agreement was ratified in 1993), 
re-initiating a level of influence over renewable resource 
management in KFN territory (Clark et al., 2014). Since the 
1995 initiation of the co-management regime and KFN’s 
participation since 2003, partners have been ensconced 
in a continuous process of learning how to undertake 
effective co-management in national parks, resulting in 
both successes and disappointments (Clark, 2009; Markel 
and Clark, 2012). Challenges, such as differing values and 
understandings of key concepts like respect for wildlife 
and appropriate methods and goals for research and 
management, have impacted trust and relationships among 
these partners (Clark et al., 2014).
Notwithstanding, KFN and Parks Canada have 
worked purposely to build their relationship over the 
intervening years. In 2000, a Parks Canada report explicitly 
recognized the important role of Indigenous peoples in 
maintaining ecological integrity within national parks 
(Parks Canada, 2000), reflecting a growing understanding 
of the interrelated nature of Indigenous-environment 
relationships. In response, a nationally funded, multiyear 
Healing Broken Connections project (2004 – 09) was 
initiated in the Kluane region, aiming “to reintegrate First 
Nation people back on the land within KNPR; and to 
determine how traditional knowledge might be used in the 
park management decision-making process” (Henry et al., 
2008:5). The project, which included workshops, culture 
and science camps, trips into the park, and traditional 
knowledge collection (Parks Canada, 2010), appears to have 
achieved some success in improving cultural reintegration 
in KNPR (Henry et al., 2008). While the project has ended, 
Parks Canada continues to support such initiatives; for 
example, by hosting a summer 2015 fly-in gathering with 
60 KFN citizens at Bighorn, a culturally significant area 
in the Park. These activities have positively influenced the 
relationship from both sides: “There was a bad attitude 
way back when, but I think Parks has really, really tried 
to change that around. Right now, we have a pretty good 
relationship with them” (Interviewee KFN1, 2015). It has 
also helped to address the fear and hesitancy among some 
KFN citizens who still remember the years of exclusion 
from the Park: 
If a kid is harvesting a sheep or gophers or whatever in 
the Kluane National Park with a Park warden, they’re 
not going to have that same kind of fear that, you know, 
their grandmother has.
(Interviewee KFN7, 2015)
A situational factor that supports contemporary 
relationships between co-management partners (Ostrom, 
1990) is the fact that KFN and Parks Canada have 
overlapping interests as both users and stewards of the land. 
Interviewees noted that overlapping mandates regarding 
wildlife management make the relationship inherently 
less confrontational: Parks Canada is not required to 
address questions of resource development in KNPR 
because the area is protected (Interviewee KFN7, 2015). 
By contrast, the relationship between KFN and YG may 
have more points of tension as the goals of conservation, 
traditional food availability, and access are more likely to 
compete with those of other land uses and users (Alatini, 
2015; Interviewee KFN1, 2015; Interviewee KFN3, 2015; 
Interviewee YG1, 2015).
Nonetheless, KFN’s current working relationships with 
different arms of YG are relatively constructive. Our data 
indicate that the leadership skills of KFN’s (then) Chief 
Alatini had an important influence. Despite the fact that her 
politics did not match those of the government at the time, 
Alatini took a personal approach to building relationships. 
“I actually have a conversation with the premier. If I have a 
problem, I will call him and say, ‘Look, I have a problem.’ 
I’m not a Conservative, but I can talk to Conservatives” 
(Alatini, 2015). The quality of leadership is a long recognized 
situational factor in co-management research (Ostrom, 1990).
Good intentions are important for trust building on both 
sides, and these appear to be prevalent among many YG 
employees. “For the most part, I just see a ton of people that 
really take that concern about protection of people and the 
environment quite seriously … every day” (Interviewee 
YG3, 2015). Interviewees further indicated that YG 
departments are typically responsive when KFN brings 
concerns to their attention (Interviewee KFN1, 2015) and 
make efforts to build relationships with First Nations. For 
example, YG’s five regional biologists are tasked with 
serving as liaisons between Environment Yukon and First 
Nations via communication and relationship building with 
First Nations in their region (Interviewee YG4, 2016). 
Meeting outside the office environment is particularly 
effective for building trust and relationships. For example, 
the Kluane area regional biologist has attended KFN 
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community events and participated in community life 
outside of official government business, which has been 
well received (Interviewee CM1, 2015). One participant 
from a co-management body explained that meeting on the 
land can help increase awareness and build understanding 
of co-management within communities:
It can’t all happen in an office setting. … On the land, 
most of the successful moments where cooperative 
management has really shone have been out on the 
actual landscape when you can bring these people 
together and mingle. … We’re familiar with cooperative 
management, but the local people aren’t because if 
you’re not invited to it, if you don’t actively get to be 
part of what’s going on, then you don’t even really 
understand what is cooperative management. I think 
that’s a really important part, but it takes time. And 
again when your capacity is limited as Kluane First 
Nation’s often is and you’re just run—stretched thin, 
you know, you can’t even breathe—you’re probably not 
putting a lot of priority behind ... ‘Yeah, let’s do a day 
camp with Yukon Government, … let’s get our Elders 
and the government people together.’ It’s kind of not 
really a priority, but it’s actually the most effective thing 
that you could do. 
(Interviewee CM1, 2015)
Despite the generally positive governance environment, 
opportunities exist to further improve the KFN-YG 
relationship. While some key employees have held their 
position for multiple years and developed appropriate 
skills and experience, the significant rate of YG employee 
turnover and limited levels of training regarding First 
Nations issues and legislation were identified by some as 
particularly challenging. One participant said it would 
be helpful if new employees went through training about 
YFNs and the Final Agreements:
I don’t think the players there stick around long enough 
to really care. Their turnover is so high, it’s rare 
that you get to work with one person for very many 
years there. … I think it would really help if Yukon 
Government personnel all went through that First 
Nations 101 training and realized what First Nations are 
all about, and if they had an idea about what those Final 
Agreements were about.
(Interviewee KFN1, 2015)
Armitage et al. (2009) highlight the importance of strong 
connections to place, building stakeholder capacities, and 
establishing long-term commitments as important drivers 
in building and sustaining successful co-management 
arrangements. Our research confirms that building 
relationships and trust is a dynamic process consisting of 
repeated interactions between co-management partners 
(Berkes, 2007). A particularly practical insight offered 
by study participants is that building trust between First 
Nations and other co-management partners happens 
through regular interactions between partners on location in 
First Nations communities and on their lands. In a relatively 
small jurisdiction in the Yukon, where residents have more 
direct access to politicians, professional relationships 
are often inherently more personal, and individuals 
can hold significant sway. This also means that formal 
business transpires not only in formal venues, but also via 
informal connections and discussions. Encouraging these 
interactions on location in First Nations communities may 
help to establish the critical foundations for meaningful 
professional relationships. As the foundation for effective 
co-management, these relationships are vital to the 
successful implementation of some of the recommendations 
made in KFN’s food security strategy, as some, including 
those relating to the conservation of KFN’s traditional 
territory and traditional food sources, fall under the shared 
purview of KFN, YG, and Parks Canada.
Information Sharing
The second theme that emerged from our analysis is 
the role of information sharing in improving resource 
management. Common-pool resources can be more 
effectively managed when co-management partners 
combine their financial, human, and other resources to 
work toward joint goals. This involves creating linkages 
among different types and levels of organization (Carlsson 
and Berkes, 2005). In terms of First Nations food security, 
benefits could arise from sharing different types of 
knowledge among co-management partners, such as 
traditional harvesting locations, wildlife population health 
status, and details about potential development. Indeed, 
improved sharing of relevant information and data between 
the co-managers of KFN’s traditional territory could help 
satisfy recommendations in KFN’s food security strategy. 
For instance, the recommendation to promote “ancient 
methods of conservation for declining animal populations” 
(KFN, 2014:21) could be more easily satisfied if 
co-management partners shared the tasks of collecting and 
analyzing data on wildlife population trends and potential 
threats to wildlife. Our findings suggest that while there 
is an understanding of the potential benefits that arise as a 
result of information sharing and that this process already 
occurs to some degree, barriers to furthering this type of 
exchange remain. 
Trust is critical for fostering willingness among 
partners to share potentially sensitive information and to 
communicate more openly (Berkes, 2007). From KFN’s 
perspective, sharing traditional harvesting information 
with YG is a sensitive issue.
I think there’s a real reluctance sometimes on the behalf 
of the First Nation to provide traditional knowledge 
without knowing how that knowledge is going to be 
used … and that was always a big issue for us when we 
were collecting information back in the days, you know, 
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through land negotiating. People were really reluctant to 
provide a lot of information to government about areas 
that were important to them … they wanted to sort of 
keep them safe. So, I think that’s another reason why 
KFN might not necessarily be comfortable sharing or 
may not even have that information ’cause people are 
concerned about sharing it. 
(Interviewee KFN7, 2015)
I think it’s a trust thing right? … you just got to sort of 
continue to build it. And governments have got to take 
First Nations’ word on a few things and First Nations 
need to find some comfort in being able to provide a 
little bit more information in certain areas. 
(Interviewee KFN7, 2015)
YG participants recognized these First Nations’ 
concerns about sharing sensitive traditional knowledge and 
acknowledged the need to both be careful with knowledge 
that is shared and limit access to it (Interviewee YG4, 2015; 
Interviewee YG1, 2015). One interviewee said, “There’s 
some sensitivities for First Nation people about sharing that 
data, so it’s something that we’re sensitive to and [we are] 
careful with that data of course” (Interviewee YG4, 2015).
Within YG’s Mining Branch, there have also been 
recent discussions about the need to develop a process or 
policy, similar to that of YESAB, to restrict public assess 
to traditional knowledge, in an effort to address some First 
Nations’ concerns (Interviewee YG1, 2015). 
Alongside these trust-related concerns regarding 
adequate protection of traditional knowledge, KFN 
participants identified concerns about the appropriate use 
of traditional knowledge when it is shared (Interviewee 
YG1, 2015; Interviewee KFN7, 2015). While YESAB has 
a process in place to restrict public access to sensitive 
traditional knowledge that First Nations submit during 
project assessments (Department of Justice, 2003; YESAB, 
2005), one KFN citizen noted: “… the YESAB process 
has never been able to take traditional knowledge and 
ways of life and worldviews with the same understanding 
and impact as Western science” (M.J. Johnson, 2015). Our 
interviewees indicated that there remains a need to deepen 
the understanding between First Nations and Western 
cultures. Clearly, where partners from different cultures 
are engaged, co-management must involve “a process of 
learning to respect differences;” otherwise, it will fail 
(Berkes, 2007:26).
At the same time, both KFN and YG interviewees 
highlighted the need for better information sharing between 
their governments. From KFN’s perspective, it would be 
beneficial if YG provided wildlife harvesting data more 
readily and in more detail. Without accurate population 
data that demonstrates a need for conservation, it can be 
difficult for KFN government to ask its citizens to curb 
their subsistence hunt (Interviewee KFN3, 2015). From 
YG’s perspective, there was recognition that if First Nations 
felt comfortable sharing key information such as locations 
used for traditional practices, it could allow the government 
to better protect those key areas from resource development 
(Interviewee YG1, 2015). 
While there is a structure in place for Yukon First Nation 
and the general public to participate in land use and wildlife 
management decisions, interviewees from KFN, YG, and 
co-management bodies raised concerns about information 
gaps. As discussed above, some gaps arise because 
co-management partners do not want to share existing 
knowledge. Other gaps arise because relevant data are not 
collected; interviewees from KFN and YG both referred 
to limited resources and alternate priorities as the main 
reason for such gaps. Gaps in both traditional and scientific 
knowledge remain. 
One of the challenges we run into … is the lack of 
good baseline information and the lack of documented 
traditional knowledge. So, in areas where there’s 
maybe activity going on, there’s often no documented 
traditional knowledge on the use of the land. 
(Interviewee YG2, 2015)
There is a need for continued documentation of 
knowledge as ecosystems and land use practices change. 
For instance, new technologies may mean that community 
members no longer hunt in large groups, reducing the level 
of shared knowledge about certain areas, even if they are 
used frequently (Interviewee KFN7, 2015). This challenge 
is exacerbated by limited human and financial resources 
in many small First Nations, which limit the amount of 
information they can collect and share. For example, 
one KFN employee is responsible for commenting on all 
YESAB reviews, so collecting traditional knowledge would 
represent a significant additional effort. 
Interviewees also underscored the importance of 
collecting more scientific data, highlighting the need for 
better information regarding wildlife trends and population 
health (Interviewee CM3, 2015; Interviewee CM5, 2015; 
Interviewee YG2, 2015). However, resource limitations 
require YG to prioritize its data collection based on a 
number of criteria, including conservation and sustainability 
concerns, potential development, time since last population 
survey, and areas where there is mutual buy-in from 
governments and harvest groups (Interviewee YG4, 2015).
One thing we try to do is focus our survey efforts in 
areas where we have some general proactive agreement 
from all the harvesters [and] all the governments [so] 
that there will be an effort to do something about those 
numbers. So, if we find out that harvest is unsustainable 
… then if we do that survey, we really hope that 
subsistence harvesters will be part of the effort to reduce 
harvest. … We do try to prioritize areas … [where] we 
think we can make a difference. 
(Interviewee YG4, 2015)
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To illustrate, in response to KFN’s stated interest and 
offer of financial contribution, YG agreed to undertake a 
survey to collect moose population data in 2014. Collecting 
this type of wildlife data is akin to managing a common 
pool resource in that the cost is borne by individual users 
or entities, while the outcomes of such activities benefit 
all users; this can incentivize free riding on the efforts 
of others (Ostrom, 1991). Our case study shows that 
co-financing may sometimes help overcome the free rider 
problem because it shows commitment, which in turn can 
help create a coalition among the partners who benefit 
most from the investment (Olson, 2000). However, in 
co-management regimes such as the Yukon where one or 
two co-management partners (e.g., YG, Parks Canada) 
have greater resources and capacities than their smaller 
First Nations government partners, undue onus should not 
be placed on the partner with fewer resources to finance 
activities that will advance their food security. In the case 
of the moose survey, the decision to co-finance has not 
furthered community buy-in or coalition building between 
co-managers (Interviewee KFN3, 2019). Funds that could 
have been directed to other initiatives were diverted from 
KFN’s conservation fund, which is financed through a 
sheep tag auction. KFN has yet to receive the results of 
the survey, which was completed in 2014. Furthermore, 
opportunities for comparing results between the 2014 
survey and previous surveys are expected to be limited 
due to a change in methodology (Interviewee KFN3, 2019). 
Thus, while co-financing may overcome some challenges 
in co-managing shared resources, this practice may present 
unique challenges of its own.
Power Sharing
The third theme that emerged from the interviews 
is the degree of control that KFN is able to exercise over 
decisions affecting the sustained availability of and access 
to traditional food sources. KFN’s food security strategy 
alludes to concerns around KFN’s limited decision-
making power over its traditional territory by including a 
recommendation to “look for ways to have greater control 
over hunting and conservation in Kluane First Nation 
traditional territory” (KFN, 2014:21). A key insight from 
the literature indicates that while co-management involves 
multiple user groups in decision-making processes, the 
actual sharing of decision power “is the result, and not the 
starting point, of [a co-management] process” (Carlsson 
and Berkes, 2005:65). Having formal institutions that 
codify rights and responsibilities is furthermore helpful 
but not a guarantee that power sharing will occur through 
co-management (Berkes, 2007; Armitage et al., 2009). 
This is because KFN is only one of several resource users 
with an advisory role in decisions affecting its traditional 
territory through the co-management arrangements 
that emerged from its land claim agreement. Under this 
legislative framework, YG, which has a greater governance 
capacity than the smaller self-governing First Nations, 
remains the most powerful co-management partner in the 
Yukon. Moreover, even though First Nations have the option 
to use the federal judiciary system to enforce constitutional 
rights in cases of disagreement, such processes have very 
high costs in terms of resources and duration and may thus 
not be pursued despite promising jurisprudence (Desmarais 
and Wittman, 2014). 
Our research corroborates these insights from 
co-management research. KFN has been able to exercise 
influence over resource management decisions relevant to 
its traditional territory, but its power is limited. Moreover, 
its influence on decision-making has emerged over time and 
involved processes of learning, problem solving, and local 
institution building (Berkes, 2007; Armitage et al., 2009). 
Our interviews yielded quite a few cases exemplifying 
the growing problem-solving capacity and learning by 
co-managers. For instance, the declining moose population 
has been a concern since the 1990s, but only when KFN 
and YG identified and seized the opportunity to co-finance 
did periodic joint moose population counts outside KNPR 
became feasible. Another example is the collaboration 
between YG, Parks Canada, and KFN to develop a 
Kluane/Duke River Moose Harvest Management Strategy 
to address overharvesting (Parks Canada, Dän Keyi 
Renewable Resources Council, Kluane First Nation, Yukon 
Environment, 2014). One YG official indicated that the 
process has, “had some really good successes in terms of 
relationship-building, but it’s also had some challenges as 
well, and that’s something we’re kind of working out right 
now” (Interviewee YG4, 2015).
Similarly, YG, YFNs, and co-management bodies such 
as the Yukon Water Board are working jointly to review 
the territory’s mine licensing process, with a view to 
better incorporating traditional knowledge (Interviewee 
YG1, 2015). Discussions are slated to include planning 
around critical wildlife habitat and cultural areas. More 
specifically, the aim is to create new processes to improve 
the information that YG has access to regarding areas 
that are highly valued by First Nations, including those 
important for plants, fish, and wildlife, and by extension, 
food security (Interviewee YG1, 2015). 
Our findings further indicate that building local 
institutions has helped KFN to exert more influence over 
activities on its lands, and continued investment in these 
processes may enable KFN to more fully exercise the 
power that was devolved to the local level through its 
land claim agreement. For instance, KFN has developed 
a land use plan, which may provide political strength in 
situations where it is pushing for further protections outside 
its Settlement Lands. Additionally, in an effort to address 
illegal hunting, KFN passed a Trespass Act (Interviewee 
KFN1, 2019), as a lack of local rules made it easy for 
outsiders to harvest from KFN’s Settlement Lands: 
The Duke Meadow is a very good hunting area for 
moose. It is Category A land. We have asked our own 
citizens not to hunt there for the past couple of years 
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because the moose numbers are declining, and our 
citizens will drive past and they will see a non-First 
Nations person hunting exactly where they have been 
told or requested not to hunt. 
(Interviewee KFN1, 2015)
However, as an example of the arduous, bureaucratic 
nature of institution building, KFN must first enact justice 
laws to enable enforcement of its Trespass Act (Interviewee 
KFN3, 2019). 
Interviewees also identified clear institutional challenges 
that limit KFN’s power to ensure the sustainability of 
traditional food sources in its traditional territory. First, 
the land claim agreement only gives advisory powers to 
First Nations outside their Settlement Lands, and second, 
it does not formally prioritize First Nations’ needs. 
Changing either of these norms requires a change in formal 
institutions, something that is not likely to occur in the 
foreseeable future. In the words of KFN’s former land 
claims negotiator,
… there are a lot of fora and opportunities for First 
Nations to … influence decision-making, and I think 
… for the most part it works, but at the end of the day 
can KFN necessarily stop something from happening? 
… It depends on the issue, right? I mean if it is on 
Settlement Land, sure. But … when it comes to lands 
and resources, fish and wildlife, those types of things, 
Yukon has the decision-making authority. And … there 
are lots of ways for KFN to influence that ... but they … 
do not control it. 
(Interviewee KFN7, 2015)
Interviewees raised concerns about KFN’s lack of 
influence over traplines, hunting quotas for outfitters in 
the region, and commercial fishing licenses. Of particular 
concern during the summer of 2015 was YG’s decision 
to remove the corridor that restricted hunting for one 
kilometer on either side of the Alaska Highway. The 
corridor was initially meant to increase safety and protect 
wildlife from unsustainable hunting pressures during 
highway construction (Interviewee YG4, 2018). However, 
a regional biologist explained that “Yukon Government 
has been moving away from the use of highway corridors 
for conservation for many years. They are not considered 
an effective or fair tool because they are generally only 
enforceable for non-subsistence harvesters” (Interviewee 
YG4, 2018). While the Dän Keyi Renewable Resources 
Council, Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board, and 
YG argued that the corridor was not an effective approach 
for protecting moose (Interviewee YG4, 2018), KFN felt 
that removing it would only increase hunting pressure on 
the already declining population. “[Now] you don’t even 
have to get off the highway; you just have to get out of your 
truck and stand in the ditch” (Interviewee KFN1, 2015). 
Similar power dynamics emerged in a contrasting case 
along the Dempster Highway where the Tetlit Gwich’in 
Renewable Resources Council, on advice from community 
Elders, hunters, and leaders in Fort MacPherson, proposed 
a temporary closure of caribou hunting from the highway 
based on traditional knowledge assertions that the herd 
leaders should not be disturbed (Padilla and Kofinas, 
2014). In 1995, a “let the leaders pass” regulation was 
endorsed by the Porcupine Caribou Management Board 
and implemented by YG. In 2007, the regulation was 
contested by a Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in (Dawson) First Nation 
member, who claimed insufficient consultation and lack 
of alignment with his Nation’s traditional knowledge. The 
Yukon Territory Minister of Environment responded by 
shifting to a “voluntary compliance” approach due to lack 
of consensus among affected parties (Padilla and Kofinas, 
2014). As such, in both the Alaska Highway and Dempster 
Highway cases, traditional knowledge was both recognized 
and valued by the co-management boards and influenced 
both discussions and decision making. However, ultimately, 
it was deemed neither sufficiently robust nor applicable 
beyond the local context, leading YG to exert its ultimate 
power over First Nations territory. 
While each co-management party has certain levels 
of influence, situational factors such as the political and 
economic climate also drive the recommendations of 
co-management boards (Nadasdy, 2007). For instance, 
one environmental assessor noted that YESAB members 
and staff are conscious that the assessment board operates 
within a specific political and economic context, and the 
assessor makes recommendations that are perceived to be 
acceptable within that context: 
In a political climate that values resource development, 
there would have to be significant adverse effects—
for instance adverse effects to caribou to the point of 
no recovery—for YESAB to recommend that Yukon 
Government reject a project. 
(Interviewee CM5, 2015)
One opportunity to increase First Nations’ influence 
involves framing their advice on land use as a food security 
issue. An environmental assessment practitioner indicated 
that the YESAB would be better positioned to consider 
the impact of development projects on KFN’s traditional 
foods if the First Nation more frequently raised the issue 
in its comments (Interviewee CM5, 2015). Moreover, 
by framing its input using the political language of food 
security, KFN could potentially shift the conversation to 
highlight food security, access to food, and right to food in 
contrast to development. As Desmarais and Wittman (2014) 
point out, First Nations have won important court cases 
by underscoring their rights to accessing and protecting 
traditional foods. Emphasizing constitutional rights in 
addition to those derived from land claim agreements 
could help shift the power balance within co-management 
arrangements. 
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At the end of the day there should be few things that 
would ever take priority over, you know, things like 
our subsistence rights, and that is pretty clear in those 
treaties. 
(Interviewee KFN7, 2015) 
Limitations
There were a number of primarily methodological 
limitations to this study. Interviews were broad, precluding 
in-depth examination of specific instances or examples. 
Furthermore, while some YG and co-management agency 
participants had knowledge of co-management with Kluane 
First Nation specifically, others spoke more broadly about 
territorial policies around consultation and departmental 
efforts to improve relationships. Thus, insights into KFN-
specific on-the-ground workings of co-management were 
limited from these perspectives. In terms of scope, the 
relationship of focus was limited to KFN, to the exclusion 
of existing and proposed co-management relationships 
with Champagne and Aishihik First Nations and White 
River First Nation (WRFN) (which has yet to settle its land 
claim), whose territories overlap with KFN.
CONCLUSION
Our research shows that the theories and empirical 
evidence from the rich co-management literature improve 
our understanding of how First Nations food security can 
be supported through the co-management of land and 
wildlife in northern Canada. Many concepts and theories 
of co-management emerged as relevant in this case 
study (italicized below), and together they advance our 
understanding of how co-management can both help and 
hinder First Nations communities in maintaining sustained 
availability of and access to traditional foods within the 
current governance regime. 
Trust building is the foundation without which none 
of the other co-management dimensions can materialize. 
The history of conflict among natural resource users and 
managers from different cultures makes building trust 
an essential activity, especially (though not exclusively) 
in the early stages of co-management. As trust develops, 
other co-management dimensions such as social learning, 
institution building, and problem solving also develop. 
KFN and the other resource users and managers, 
are learning how to use and shape the still relatively 
new decision-making space formed by the land claim 
agreements. KFN employees are building networks around 
and beyond formal co-management arrangements and 
are able to mobilize them to address issues affecting the 
availability of and access to traditional foods. As a self-
governing First Nation, KFN is building institutions locally 
to fill regulatory gaps following the settlement of its land 
claim agreement, allowing it to exercise more control over 
its Settlement Lands. KFN is problem solving with other 
co-management partners regarding issues that affect its 
traditional territory, such as through joint participation and 
financing of moose population counts as a means to gain 
traction regarding specific wildlife concerns. The sharing 
of information and communication more broadly are key 
means through which social learning, institution building, 
and problem solving occur. The consequence of these 
efforts is that KFN can exercise power over decisions that 
affect the sustained availability of and access to traditional 
foods, which are an important contributor to the food 
security of community members. 
Our findings indicate that the co-management 
arrangements in which KFN participates are slowly 
maturing, with some partnerships having reached higher 
levels of collaboration (e.g., Parks Canada versus YESAB 
and various parts of YG). A crucial factor explaining these 
differences is the degree to which the different partners 
trust and understand each other. There is a need for 
further trust building between First Nations and various 
territorial government players. Without such efforts, 
further opportunities for sharing information will not 
materialize, nor will it be attractive for co-management 
partners to invest their own limited resources to collect 
new information that could improve resource management. 
Nonetheless, various known contextual factors also 
play a role. One reason for the differences in relationship 
maturation is that the goals of First Nations and territorial 
governments are more likely to diverge, thereby making 
co-management relations inherently more conflictual. 
The leadership exercised by certain individual champions 
appears to be another relevant contextual factor (Ostrom 
1990; Armitage et al., 2009; Clark and Slocombe, 2011), 
one that can contribute positively to relationship building 
and the exercising of First Nations influence.
There are a number of opportunities for building on this 
research. A multiple case study design would be useful in 
identifying and comparing similarities and differences in 
the experiences of various YFNs that participate in land 
use and wildlife management. Likewise, further research 
could usefully test the strength of our conclusions, 
including the degree to which the framing of food security 
as a co-management goal may influence the perspectives 
and participation of co-managers in land and wildlife 
decision making. 
In sum, a key contribution of this research is that it is 
the first to apply the knowledge from the co-management 
literature to a case study focusing on the relationship between 
co-management and food security in northern First Nation 
communities. This new avenue for research offers many 
analytical tools that could help make policy and governance 
a positive rather than a negative driver of food security 
(Loring and Gerlach, 2015). Another key contribution of this 
research, relevant for both practitioners and co-management 
scholars, is that First Nations in northern Canada may 
increase their influence on resource management decisions 
by framing resource use issues through the lens of food 
security, thereby making a tighter connection between 
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resource use, traditional foods, and constitutional rights. 
Building local institutions and the formulation of local 
resource use strategies can further help First Nations to 
gain more control over food security. Yet, while showing 
the potential for increased decision-making power for First 
Nations communities, there are clear limits to its expansion 
within the current institutional and cultural context. 
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